

PLUTARCH'S *DE FORTUNA ROMANORUM**

Plutarch's essay *de fortuna Romanorum* has attracted divergent judgements. Ziegler dismissed it as 'eine nicht weiter ernst zu nehmende rhetorische Stilübung'. By Flacelière it was hailed as 'une ébauche de méditation sur le prodigieux destin de Rome'.¹ It is time to consider the work afresh and to discover whether there is common ground between these two views. Rather than offering a general appreciation, my treatment will take the work chapter by chapter, considering points of interest as they arise. This method will enable us to compare what Plutarch says on particular subjects and themes in *de fort. Rom.* with what he says or does not say about them elsewhere. We shall thus be able to see clearly that for the most part the ideas he presents in the essay correspond with his thoughts about the rôle of fortune expressed in more serious writing, and that, where there is no correspondence, this is attributable to the rhetorical background. I do not intend to address directly the frequently discussed but insoluble question of whether we have in *de fort. Rom.* only one of two original works, that is whether there was once a *de virtute Romanorum* which Plutarch composed or answered. *De fort. Rom.* itself in fact gives almost as much prominence to ἀρετή as to τύχη, and their competing rôles will be carefully evaluated.² Nor do I look at the dating of the work (an early date has been suggested on grounds of genre, a later one on grounds of the essay's familiarity with Rome, but there is not enough evidence for a firm conclusion).³ I begin with a brief summary.

Plutarch indicates the broad structure he has in mind by stating at the beginning of 5 that 1–4 have formed an introduction (ἀρχή). At the beginning of 8 he makes another break by stating that he is moving on from the 'testimonies of the witnesses' to 'testimonies from the actions themselves' (320a). In fact the next two chapters are devoted to the kings and it is not until 11 that Plutarch really turns his attention to 'the best known deeds and the most famous wars' (323e).

Of the introductory chapters 1–2 set out the nature of the contest between τύχη and

* I should like to acknowledge the helpful comments of the Editors and D. A. Russell.

¹ K. Ziegler, *RE* II.1, 719–21, at 720; R. Flacelière, 'Plutarque, "De Fortuna Romanorum"', *Mélanges Carcopino* (1966), 367–75, at 368. Other standard works consulted are R. Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea* i (Berlin, 1869), pp. 45ff.; J. Palm, *Rom, Römertum und Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit* (Lund, 1959), pp. 34–6; R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch and his Times* (London, 1967), pp. 122–30; C. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 67–71; F. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled* (Leiden, 1977), pp. 157–63.

² In favour of a *de virt. Rom.*: E. Lassel, *De fortunae in Plutarchi operibus notione* (Marburg, 1891), p. 57; Ziegler, art. cit. (n. 1), 720–1; Barrow, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 122; Jones, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 67 n. 2; against: A. Wardman, *CQ* 5 (1955), 99 n. 6; Palm, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 34 n. 1. Palm makes the point that the *de fort. Rom.* would not have so much on Rome's ἀρετή had there been a separate treatment of this. That there is almost equal treatment is the reason for the title given in some MSS, *περί τῆς ῥωμαίων τύχης ἢ ἀρετῆς* (πότερον τὰ ῥωμαίων πράγματα τύχης ἢ ἀρετῆς); in the *Lamp. Cat.* (no. 175) the work is called *περί τῆς ῥωμαίων τύχης*.

³ An earlier date, favoured by most editors and commentators, means 60–65 ('in the reign of Nero', Jones, op. cit. [n. 1], p. 67 n. 3); for a later dating, see Barrow, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 127–8. An earlier date may be preferable, since in addition to the not unreasonable assumption that Plutarch's inclination to rhetoric diminished with age, it should be pointed out that his knowledge of Rome in the essay is not as sound as has been claimed; see below n. 26 (Aemilius Scaurus), nn. 31–4 (temples of Virtue), nn. 36–8 (temples of Fortune), n. 43 (eclipse at birth of Romulus), p. 511 (Sextus Pompeius). The arguments of F. H. Sandbach, *CQ* 33 (1939), 196–7, for an early date on the evidence of clausulae are of doubtful worth.

ἀρετή, first giving them their traditional attributes, then making the analogy between Rome and nature, since the question which power is responsible for Rome applies also to the universe (1, 316e). In 2 Plutarch expands the analogy, taking into account the Platonic Demiourgos, and Physis which gave the world order according to the physicists, then linking these to the foundation of the Roman state. In the third and fourth chapters he describes two rival processions 'from my look-out point',⁴ the one consisting of Romans who profess adherence to ἀρετή, the other of those who follow τύχη.⁵ In 5 Plutarch asks if one might not bring on actual witnesses to τύχη, 'since they [the Romans] attributed more to Fortune than to Virtue'.⁶ He proceeds to record temples which the Romans had to put up to Virtue and to Fortune, finishing with 'the temple they have built in the gardens bequeathed by [Julius] Caesar' (319b). In 6–7 Plutarch takes up the subject of Caesar and Augustus and the aid they received from fortune in defeating their enemies.

In 8 Plutarch elaborates the protective rôle of τύχη at the birth of Rome and her care for Romulus, then in 9 treats another early protégé of hers, Numa. In 10 he goes on to talk of the later kings and the temples of Fortune which they put up. Next in 11 he comes down to historical times 'lest we seem to withdraw into the grey area, as it were, of the distant past' (323e), and briefly sketches the Roman conquest of the world after the Hannibalic War. In 12, as an example of the help given by τύχη to the city in times of crisis, Plutarch works up the story of the Gallic invasion and sack of Rome. Then in 13, apologising for dwelling on matters which are uncertain owing to the destruction of records in the Gallic sack, he speculates on the conflict which could have arisen between Rome and Alexander the Great, had not fortune killed him off. The essay terminates abruptly.

The *de fort. Rom.* is unrevised as well as unfinished, as is shown by the verbally close duplication of 5, 318d–f (listing the earliest temples of Virtue and temples of Fortune) at 10, 322c–e. This is clearly not a case of the studied rephrasing which appealed to the professionals of the Second Sophistic. It is hard to say what has happened. Plutarch was not always a careful writer and this kind of repetition is found elsewhere (there is an equally obtrusive example at *Alex.* 37.7 and 56.1). However, if we assume that *de fort. Rom.* was originally performed as a public encomium,⁷ the repetition could not have been present since it would have attracted

⁴ For the conceit, the 'heights of wisdom' (cf. *Ciris* 14ff., Lucretius 2.7ff., Plato, *Sophist* 216c), in the Second Sophistic, see G. Anderson, *Lucian. Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic* (Leiden, 1976), pp. 16–17.

⁵ cf. the rival choruses of poets/actors and generals at *de glor. Ath.* 348e–350b.

⁶ cf. *Publ.* 23.1 εἰωθότες ἅπανι τοῖς μεγάλοις ἐπιφημίζειν τὸ δαιμόνιον, *Sulla* 6.9; Plutarch's approval of this course is shown by *de laude ips.* 542e–543a.

⁷ Such speeches are attested in Plutarch's age. Note Athenaeus, *deipn.* 98c 'a public encomium of the Imperial City' by the sophist Pompeianus of Philadelphia; Aristides 26 *To Rome* (delivered at Rome, 1, 3, 7, etc.); and especially a victory list belonging to the Thespian Erotideia and dating to A.D. 20 (A. Schachter, *Cults of Boeotia* i, ii, iv [Inst. Class. Stud. Bull. Suppl. nos. 38.1 (1981), 38.2 (1986), 38.4 (1981)], ii, pp. 173–5 no. [xiv]) which contains an ἐγκωμ[ιογ]ρά[φ]ον εἰς Ἑρωτα καὶ Ῥωμαίους (other evidence for the Erotideia points to athletic competitions alone [i, pp. 218–19, with 218 n. 6], but note that the agon early on added the title 'Romaia' [i, p. 219 n. 2]; another festival, the Thespian Mouseia, had regular encomia of the emperor (ii, pp. 176–9 nos. xvi–xviii). Polemo's description of Rome as the 'epitome of the world' perhaps also came from an encomium (Galen xviii, 347 K.; cf. Athenaeus, *deipn.* 20b). It is impossible to say where Plutarch's speech might have been delivered. A Roman setting would be suggested by the passage at 321a (τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα βασιλεία, κτλ; cf. Palm, op. cit. [n. 1], p. 36 n. 2), were these words Plutarch's and not part of Fortune's address to the Virtue of Romulus (so Jones, op. cit. [n. 1], p. 67 n. 4); one could also point to 318a (οὕτως εἰσῆλθεν [Fortune] εἰς Ῥώμην ὡς μενοῦσα, κτλ), but again the procession of Fortune with attendant

ridicule.⁸ There is no question of excising 318d–f (the material relating to the women's embassy and the utterance of the statue of Fortuna Muliebris at 318f–319a is dependent upon it), and we may suggest that although 322c–e is not out of place (Plutarch continues by introducing Servius Tullius and discussing at length his several temples of Fortune, 322e–323a) it is a later alternative (note the introduction *ἐξέσται δ' οὕτω θεωρεῖν*) to the earlier passage which is duller but less inaccurate.⁹ We cannot say whether it is by Plutarch or another.

A more fundamental criticism of the essay concerns the meaning of *τύχη*.¹⁰ The sense of this word in Plutarch's writings is varied. In the religious and philosophical works of the *Moralia* he carefully distinguishes between events which are guided by providence and those which happen by chance. In these works *τύχη* always means 'chance', while divine guidance is expressed by *θεός* (*θεοί*), *δαίμων* (*δαίμονες*), or *πρόνοια* and some other terms. Elsewhere, especially in the *Lives*, the situation is different: we still have *θεός* and *δαίμων* directing actions, but *τύχη*, which very often means 'chance',¹¹ may also at times indicate a guiding force and is used in contexts where we would have expected 'God' or 'providence'.¹² The reason for the change is that there is less need for terminological exactness in non-technical writing. This applies also to *de fort. Rom.* Here, while *τύχη* can mean 'chance', for the most part it signifies a directive force.¹³

It has been suggested by R. H. Barrow that Plutarch changed the meaning of *τύχη* in the midst of *de fort. Rom.* without being conscious of doing so. 'In the early chapters Fortune is set in contrast with Providence: she is the Goddess of Chance, equipped with wings and poised upon a ball... Soon she becomes... the protecting power which attends men... later she becomes the divine purpose which intervenes to save a people from disaster and to guide it to its high destiny.'¹⁴ Barrow did not indicate the point of change, but was presumably referring to chapters 1–4 versus 5–7 and 8–13. It is important to remember that, however far the essay reflects Plutarch's thought elsewhere, its nature is strongly rhetorical and a degree of inconsistency arises naturally from this. Certainly in 1 *τύχη* is 'unstable' and the opposite of human *σοφία* and *πρόνοια* (316c–e), in 2 she is again a haphazard power, and in 4 she is the goddess Tyche flitting around on her ball (at least until she comes to rest at Rome); whereas in 8–13 *τύχη* adopts the function of a guiding power (cf. 11, 323e 'the divine escort of the wind of *τύχη*').¹⁵ Plutarch makes things easy for himself in given

Roman heroes must be imagined as taking place at Rome. Plutarch's references to Romans in the third person (320c *ἐορτάζουσιν*, 322a, c *καλοῦσιν*) may, though not necessarily, indicate a Greek audience; this is favoured by the treatment of Greece itself in the work (see n. 66 with text).

⁸ cf. Lucian, *pseudol.* 5–6 (with C. P. Jones, *Culture and Society in Lucian* [Cambridge, Mass., 1986], pp. 110–15), Philostratus, *V.S.* p. 579.

⁹ The ascription of the temple of Virtus at 322c to Marcellus is substantially more reliable than that at 318d to Scipio Aemilianus – see p. 510. It has been held of course that 10 has the earlier version ('Plutarchum illo cap. 10 loco rem tantum adumbravisse, postea vero paulo mutatum et amplificatam capiti 5 inseruisse', Nachstädt, Teubner *Moralia* ii.2 [1935], p. 43 with literature).

¹⁰ Plutarch's ideas on fortune and providence are examined by me in a paper to appear in *AJP* 110 (1989).

¹¹ This meaning is made plainer by phrases like *ἀπὸ τύχης*, *διὰ τύχην*, etc. (see Lassell, op. cit. [n. 2], pp. 38–9), or is reinforced by another term such as *αὐτομάτως* (e.g. *Cato Min.* 19.3).

¹² For example *Rom.* 8.9, *Cam.* 6.3, *Demosth.* 19.1 (*δαμόνιος*), *Phil.* 17.2 (cf. *Flam.* 12.10 *θεός*), *Dion* 4.3–4, *Marc.* 3.2 (*ἀγαθή*), *Pomp.* 53.8–9, *Phoc.* 3.4, *Luc.* 19.6 (*θεία*), *Tim.* 16.10–11.

¹³ Note that it is only in *de fort. Rom.* that *τύχη* is set up as a goddess (4, 317e–318a, cf. 9, 321c).

¹⁴ Barrow, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 126–7.

¹⁵ In this directive sense note also *ὁ Ῥωμαίων μέγας δαίμων* at 11, 324b–d, and even

contexts. In fact the distinction between the providential and non-providential side of *τύχη* is maintained to a far greater extent in *de fort. Rom.* than is often the case elsewhere (particularly in the *Lives*). At the beginning of the work the rhetorical structure demands the sharpest contrast between fortune and virtue. This is best achieved by having *τύχη* denote a fairly random power 'chance' (an easy meaning in a phrase like *κατὰ τύχην* at 316e or *κατὰ τύχας* at 317b). The idea of providence, which is later and for most of the essay expressed by *τύχη*, is expressed by *χρόνος* and *θεός* (2, 316f – note how the foundation image here is applied at 8, 320b to *τύχη*).¹⁶

There are comparable problems with *ἀρετή*. In 1–4 *ἀρετή* is presented alongside *τύχη* as a higher power. Clearly this is not a serious idea but is all part of the rhetorical background, for *ἀρετή* – even if in the image of the gods – is a human resource in Plutarch's thought.¹⁷ More important for the understanding of *de fort. Rom.* is the fact that in these early chapters *ἀρετή* undergoes a shift of meaning. In 1–2 it looks remarkably like virtue. In 1 it is equivalent to wisdom and foresight, in 2 Rome's origin is accompanied by 'every virtue' (317c). But in 3 and the rest of the essay it is not virtue, but rather courage or prowess. This helps to account for an important difference between *de fort. Rom.* and other non-rhetorical works. There are a number of passages in Plutarch's writings which make clear his belief that Rome's rise to world power had been facilitated by providence with the aim of spreading order and harmony through the world.¹⁸ This idea is mentioned in *de fort. Rom.* 2 where Rome is 'a hearth for all men which is truly holy and gift-bearing' (317a), and is responsible for a common peace (317c). Here Roman dominion goes closely with benefaction and *ἀρετή* meaning virtue. In the rest of the essay *ἀρετή* means courage since there is no place to talk of universal benefits as Rome goes hither and thither conquering. Rome's lack of altruism is a departure also from the essays *de Alex. Mag. fort. aut virt.* with their emphasis on the practical and spiritual benefits Alexander made to his empire, especially in the first essay (cf. 328b–329a) where he is the philosopher *par excellence*. The Alexander essays build on the opposition between *τύχη* and *ἀρετή*, which in Alexander's case is between fortune and virtue (see for example i 332c–333a, ii 342f, 344e). With Alexander Plutarch is depicting a

ταῦτόματον at 12, 324d. *δαίμων* is often used loosely in the *Lives* for or in addition to *θεός* (e.g. *Caes.* 66.1, *Ag./Cleom.* 43.7, *Fab.* 14.2). On 'the great daimon of the Romans', see below n. 49 with text. Note that *ταῦτόματον* is unique in a directive sense, though cf. *Tim.* 12.9 where the doors to the temple of the god Adranos open *αὐτόματοι* (more than 'of their own accord'; see Brenk, op. cit. [n. 1], p. 37); its meaning at *de fort. Rom.* 324d is made plainer by its juxtaposition with *τύχη* in a directive meaning (elsewhere in Plutarch's works this common combination means 'by chance', 'accidentally', etc.).

¹⁶ For the sense of *χρόνος*, cf. *de Pyth. orac.* 398e.

¹⁷ cf. *de virt. mor.* 444c–d, *de sera num. vind.* 550d–e.

¹⁸ The main areas of divine involvement are: the success of Romulus and Remus and the origin of Rome (*Rom.* 8.9, *Cam.* 6.3); Roman expansion in Greece and the Greek East (*Phil.* 17.2, *Flam.* 12.10); the establishment of monarchy by Caesar and Octavian (*Phoc.* 3.4, *Pomp.* 53.8–9, 75.5, *Dion–Brut. synk.* 2.2, *Cim.–Luc. synk.* 1.1, *Caes.* 63.1, *Brut.* 47.7, *Ant.* 56.6). Divine aid is linked with the establishment of political stability in *Flam.* 12, *Pomp.* 75.5, *Dion–Brut. synk.* 2.2; and the stability and legality which are promoted by the ideal ruler whose virtue is in God's image (cf. *max. cum princ. phil. esse dis.* 776f, *ad princ. induct.* 781a) are close to the real political benefits of the Empire in Plutarch's own time (*de Pyth. orac.* 408b, *de tranq. an.* 469e, *an seni resp. ger. sit* 784f, *praec. ger. reip.* 824c). It should be remembered that Plutarch's explanations in terms of divine causality must always be taken with explanations made in terms of human causality (e.g. in *Flam.* 12 God lends a hand, but Greek peoples and kings increase Rome's power voluntarily because they appreciate the stability she offers; at *Cim.–Luc. synk.* 1.1 *τὸ πεπρωμένον* changes the constitution through the Civil Wars, but these were of course started by men, *Pomp.* 70, *de Stoic. repug.* 1049d; and so on for every case of divine involvement).

philosopher and ἀρετή must mean virtue with wide benefits; in the Roman work he paints ἀρετή in the main 'historical' part in traditional national Roman colours (cf. 317d, 320f, 323e; *Cor.* 1.6 *virtus* properly means ἀνδρεία), and there is consequently no idea of benefaction.

De fort. Rom. glorifies Rome both for her good fortune and for her fighting ability. In 1–2 ἀρετή (as virtue) and τύχη (as fortune) are brought together by Time and God; in the rest of the essay τύχη takes over the guidance of Rome and works alongside human courage to further her success. At 2, 316e Plutarch is close to his normal ideas about such co-operation: 'I believe myself to be right in suspecting that, even if Fortune and Virtue are engaged in complete and continual warfare and discord with one other, nevertheless for such a welding together of dominion and power, it is likely that they came to terms and united'. One must remain aware that vocabulary and phrasing which elsewhere indicate serious thought may not do so in a rhetorical piece; but in this case we have a clear example of Plutarch's rhetoric, which personifies Fortune and Virtue, resting on serious opinions about virtue being thrown into relief by fortune. The idea that ἀρετή needs the additional factors τύχη and δύναμις τελεσιουργός (*Solon-Publ. synk.* 3.5, *Dion* 1.3) is fundamental to Plutarch's thought elsewhere and to his conception here of Rome's rise to greatness.¹⁹ The established city is often regarded as offering those additional factors.²⁰ So again at 316f, 'Time which laid the foundation of Rome with the help of God blended and yoked together τύχη and ἀρετή.' At the beginning of 3, 317c Plutarch pictures τύχη and ἀρετή advancing ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκρισιν καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα. Good use is made of legal jargon as a thematic background in *de soll. anim.* (965c, 975c, 985c), where the 'case' is finally awarded to neither of the advocates for land and for sea animals, but instead the basic intelligence of both types of creature is affirmed despite the differences between them (985c).²¹ In the same manner the comparative technique here at *de fort. Rom.* 317c with its allusions to court procedure (cf. 318a, 318d, 320a, 323e) really affirms the bilateral nature of Rome's success.²²

The double-sided contribution is in part the reason why with much rhetorical elaboration Plutarch presents in 3 and 4 one group of Romans as devotees of Virtue and one proclaiming themselves for Fortune. Taken together they demonstrate Rome's dependence on both. Another reason for the two groups concerns Plutarch's overall view of Rome's development so far as τύχη is concerned. Plutarch lists those following Virtue at 3, 317d: Fabricii, Camilli, Lucii Cincinnati, Fabii Maximi, Claudii Marcelli, Scipiones, Gaius Marius, Mucius Scaevola, Marcus Horatius (for the plurals it is legitimate to take him as meaning 'men like Fabricius, etc.',²³ though both Scipiones may be meant). The list of those following Fortune is given at 4, 318b–c: Numa, Priscus, Aemilius Paulus, Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (together with his sons Quintus Balearicus, Lucius Diadematus, Marcus Metellus, Gaius Caprarius, his 'two sons-in-law of consular rank, and his grandsons distinguished by illustrious deeds and offices'), Aemilius Scaurus, and Cornelius Sulla. Plutarch indicates at 2,

¹⁹ The plainest examples of collaboration by τύχη and ἀρετή come in *Aem.-Tim.*, especially *Aem.* 2.3, *Tim.* 21.5, 36.4 (fortune in *Aem.-Tim.* is discussed by me in a paper to appear in *Historia* 38 [1989]).

²⁰ cf. *Aem.-Tim. synk.* 2.1, *Ag./Cleom.-Gracchi synk.* 1.2–3, *Cim.-Luc. synk.* 2.2, *Phil.-Flam. synk.* 2.2.

²¹ For legal jargon in *synkrisis* cf. also *Cim.-Luc. synk.* 3.6, *Thes.-Rom. synk.* 3.3. On Plutarch's interest in pointing out relative differences in qualities that are essentially similar, cf. *de mul. virt.* 243b–d, *Phoc.* 3.7–9.

²² cf. Palm, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 34–6, on the close relations of ἀρετή and τύχη in *de fort. Rom.*

²³ cf. *de glor. Ath.* 345e, 348e, *Flam.* 11.5, *Arist.-Cato Maj. synk.* 1.3.

317c that ἀρετή was always present at Rome, but his examples of men who proclaim Virtue come almost exclusively from the early and middle Republic. Of the other group, those who proclaim Fortune, all apart from Numa and Priscus come from the post-Hannibalic late Republican era. These supporters of Fortune follow naturally after Plutarch's introduction of their goddess at 4, 317f–318a, where she is imagined as coming to Rome permanently after 'she had deserted the Persians and Assyrians, had flitted lightly across Macedonia, had quickly shaken off Alexander, made her way through Egypt and Syria swopping round kingdoms, and turning about had often exalted the Carthaginians' (cf. 324b).²⁴

Of those singled out for their good fortune three were indeed famous on this score (Aemilius Paulus, Metellus Macedonicus, Sulla²⁵). Aemilius Scaurus is included because he was a 'new man', and Numa and Priscus because they were immigrants ('from the Sabines', 'from Tarquinii');²⁶ Macedonicus' descendants and relatives do not follow fortune independently.²⁷ If we take those whose *Lives* Plutarch wrote, in the *Numa* Numa's appointment to the monarchy is labelled 'divine' (*Lyc.-Numa synk.* 4.15), Aemilius is blessed by public, if not private, success (*Aem.* 1.6, 24.2–6, 36.3–9), and Sulla is recognised as enjoying the favour of the gods (*Sulla* 14.12, 27.6, 28.12, 38.5), even if this is distinguished from his own claims (6.7).

The men who side with ἀρετή are not misplaced in their loyalty either. Of those whose biographies we have by Plutarch, Camillus and Marcellus are not associated with τύχη (and related terms) in any way, nor is Fabius (except perhaps at *Fab.* 19.8 where he is saved by augury – 'one could ascribe this to the favour of the gods'). In *Marius* there is a good deal on Marius' relations with fortune, but mostly on the mutations of fortune he underwent and his constant dissatisfaction (see the extended comment at 45.8–46.5). There is no sense in the *Life* in which he can be seen as a favourite of fortune like Sulla, and the victor of the Cimbric Wars is a natural follower of ἀρετή.²⁸ Fabricius (*Pyr.* 20), the Scipiones (frr. 2–4), Mucius Scaevola (*Publ.* 17.2–8), and Marcus Horatius (*Publ.* 16.6–9), were also well known to Plutarch as paragons of virtue.²⁹

Plutarch's division is of course artificial, rhetorical, and inconsistent. We should remind ourselves again that characters in the *Lives* and in the *Moralia* depend on both τύχη and ἀρετή. So, Aemilius is associated with virtue in his *Life*, as is Numa in his, and Sulla at least has military virtue (*Sulla* 6.13, cf. 12.12). Marius and Scipio Aemilianus (if he is meant at 317d) as followers of ἀρετή contradict the general

²⁴ The list of four (or five) empires is canonical – cf. Aristoxenus, fr. 50 W. (= Athenaeus, *deipn.* 545d), III Sibylline Oracle 158–61, Polybius 38.22.2, Dion. Hal. 1.2.2–3, Philo, *quod deus immutab. sit* 173–5, Dio of Prusa 79.6, Appian, Pref. 8–10, Aristides 26.15–57, Origen, *In Gen.* 36f. (*Pat. Gr.* xii, 60 M.), Porphyry in Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 9.10.3, *et al.*; see further J. Swain, *CPh* 35 (1940), 1–21.

²⁵ Aemilius Paulus – e.g. Livy 45.41, Pliny, *H.N.* 4.39; Macedonicus – Cicero, *de fin.* 5.82, *Tusc. disp.* 1.85, Velleius Paterculus 1.11.6–7, Valerius Maximus 7.1.1, Pliny, *H.N.* 7.142; Sulla – e.g. Diodorus Siculus 38.15, Appian, *B.C.* 1.450–5, *SIG*³ 747.52.

²⁶ Scaurus was not a *novus*, but rather restored his family name from desuetude (Cicero, *Pro Mur.* 16). For καὶνὸς ἄνθρωπος (318c), see *Cato Maj.* 1.2.

²⁷ For Diadematus, cf. *Cor.* 11.4; one wonders if we see in this list the fruits of research on the Caecilii for the *Life of Metellus Numidicus* (cf. *Marius* 29.12)? On the fortune of Macedonicus' family, see the references collected on Macedonicus in n. 25.

²⁸ cf. T. Carney, *PACA* 10 (1967), 15: 'Marius, for the ancients, seems to have been primarily the hero of the Cimbric Wars and the army reformer'; but note C. Gilbert, *CQ* 23 (1973), 106–7, on the possibility of a tradition associating Marius with assistance by fortune.

²⁹ Cincinnatus is not mentioned elsewhere in Plutarch's works. At *praec. ger. reip.* 820e Horatius (Cocles) is named Publius, but both praenomina occur (F. Münzer, *RE* VIII, 2335).

scheme – implied by the lists of names and the remarks on *τύχη* at 317f–318a – under which fortune is prominent in the time of the kings and the last hundred or so years of the Republic, while it is the heroes of the early and middle Republic who follow virtue. Nevertheless, in broad terms the representatives of *τύχη* do reflect what we find in the *Lives*. There fortune is involved especially in the origin of Rome, her control of Greece, the fall of the Republic and the establishment of first Caesar's, then Octavian's monarchy.³⁰ At *Fab.* 27.2 Plutarch speaks of 'the great and secure good fortune of the country' after Hannibal. In *de fort. Rom.* the followers of fortune come either from the very early regal or, and for the most part, the post-Hannibalic periods. That Romulus, Caesar, and Octavian, who are especially favoured by fortune in the *Lives* are omitted at 318b–c may be explained by the fact that Caesar and Octavian are treated as conspicuous examples of good fortune in chapters 6–7, and Romulus is greatly favoured by *τύχη* (and *ἀρετή*) in 8.

The four introductory chapters show the close relation of *de fort. Rom.* to Plutarch's ideas as we see them elsewhere. In chapter 5 Plutarch moves on to discuss temples of Fortune and Virtue at Rome. It was only late on in Rome's existence, he says, that Scipio Aemilianus built a temple to Arete (i.e. Virtus), Marius that to Virtue and Honour, and Aemilius Scaurus that to Mens at the time of the Cimbric Wars, by when there had already been an influx into the city of 'philosophies, sophistries, and casuistry' (318d–e; cf. 322c–d); note Scaurus' link with *ἀρετή* at 318e – Plutarch feels no inconsistency with 318c above. Plutarch's accuracy in this passage is poor. He is the only source for a temple of Virtus founded by Scipio Aemilianus,³¹ and since he is basically correct in attributing (in similar words) a temple of Virtus to Marcellus 'the conqueror of Syracuse' in the reduplication of 318d at 322c,³² the existence of Scipio's temple may be called into question. Marius was indeed the first to erect a single temple to Honos and Virtus, but a double shrine had been in existence since 205 in accordance with the wishes of Marcellus and the pontiffs, as Plutarch knew himself at some stage (cf. *Marc.* 28.2).³³ A temple to Mens had existed since 215.³⁴

Plutarch continues by citing Ancus Marcius as the first builder of a temple of Fortune at Rome, and the man who 'probably gave *τύχη* the title *ἀνδρεία*' (318f). Here he errs again. There was a cult in and around Rome of Fors Fortuna,³⁵ and it is plausibly suggested that *fors* in an oblique case could easily have been confused with *fortis* 'brave', 'manly'. This is the mistake Dionysius of Halicarnassus makes when talking of the temple of Tyche Andreia at 4.27.7. Dionysius is not named by Plutarch here, but is certainly the source of the mistake. Possibly Plutarch felt that his interpretation of *fors* was correct because of his own opinion that early Romans

³⁰ See n. 18.

³¹ S. Platner and T. Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (London, 1929), p. 582; G. Lugli, *Fontes ad topographiam veteris urbis Romae pertinentes* vi (Rome, 1965), p. 402 no. 338.

³² In fact it was dedicated by Marcellus' son in 205 (Livy 29.11.13) as the second of adjacent temples to Honos and to Virtus authorised by the pontiffs in 208 on the basis of a vow first made by Marcellus in 222 to rededicate the existing temple of Honos to both deities (Livy 27.25.7–9); see n. 33.

³³ Marius' temple: Platner–Ashby, op. cit. (n. 31), pp. 259–60. Marcellus': eid., pp. 258–9. A few MSS read Marcellus instead of Marius at 318e – this is clearly a later correction, influenced by 322c. *Marc.* 28.2 is based on Livy 27.25.7–9 (see n. 32); Plutarch was directly acquainted with Livy 27 (*Marc.* 24.5; Livy 27.2.2).

³⁴ Eid., p. 339; this may have been restored by Aemilius Scaurus, for he carried out similar work on the temple of Fides, also on the Capitol (p. 209).

³⁵ There were four temples – eid., pp. 212–14.

thought in terms of ἀνδρεία rather than ἀρετή when they used *virtus* (*Cor.* 1.6), and so the mistake satisfied his desire of pointing out Rome's dependence on both fortune and virtue. Plutarch makes a further error of his own by ascribing the first temple of fortune to Ancus Marcius, for all other authors say that Servius was the first to found a temple of Fortune of any sort.³⁶ This is in spite of his knowledge of Servius' temples of Fortune at 322f–323a and *quaest. Rom.* 74, 281d–f (though the latter passage may reveal a shallow knowledge of the subject if, as is thought, it derives from an alphabetical list in Latin).³⁷

Plutarch continues in 5 by mentioning the temple of Fortuna Muliebris founded in the age of Coriolanus and that of Rumour erected by Camillus (318f–319a); again, no inconsistency is felt with Camillus as an adherent of ἀρετή at 317d. Next he makes a bridge from the temple of Tyche 'which they call φόρτυς' (319a–b)³⁸ in the Gardens of Julius Caesar to Caesar and Octavian themselves (6–7). Caesar is aided by fortune in the Civil War and Plutarch tells the story of him encouraging his pilot in the midst of a storm to have 'confidence because you carry Caesar and the Fortune of Caesar' (319c–d).³⁹ Fortune's part in Caesar's success is celebrated with a fanfare of alliteration and assonance (319d). There is a particular correspondence with the *Lives* in the notion that Pompey's flight to Egypt was not his own idea, but was prompted by fortune (319d).⁴⁰ With Octavian (7) we seem to have a rather perverse rewriting of history: it was 'τύχη that imposed him upon Cicero, Lepidus, Pansa, Hirtius, and Mark Antony ... and she threw these men down, through whom he had mounted, and left him only' (319e). It is odd that Sextus Pompeius is not added to these victims of fortune. Behind the rhetoric stands Plutarch's belief that providence did want monarchy at Rome, a monarchy destined for Caesar Octavian.⁴¹

The cases of Cicero and Antony in chapter 7 show well where the analyst in Plutarch divides from the rhetorician. In *Cic.* there is no suggestion that Cicero is the victim of fortune in respect of the use made of him by Octavian. Indeed, having recorded Cicero's dream of Octavian's future greatness and its influence on his pro-Octavian policy (44.3–45.1), Plutarch adds, 'these, then, were the reasons which were being mentioned; but it was his hatred of Antony in the first place, and then his nature which had a weakness for honour that really attached him to Caesar' (cf. 45.6). Plutarch does not seem prepared to credit the dream as having happened (cf. 44.5, 7 φασί) or as explaining policy, and looks instead for human motives. The fall of Antony is a like case. Cleopatra is attributed to 'the τύχη of Caesar' in the essay (319f), whereas in the *Life* her effect is analysed in human terms (25–9, 36.1) barring

³⁶ cf. W. Otto, *RE* VII, 16.

³⁷ See H. Rose, *The Roman Questions of Plutarch* (Oxford, 1924), p. 200. Note also *quaest. Rom.* 106, 289b–c.

³⁸ Possibly the same mistakes as at 318f, though referring to a different temple; see Platner–Ashby, op. cit. (n. 31), p. 213; cf. *Brut.* 20.3.

³⁹ This is abbreviated and slightly altered in the *Life* at 38.5. τύχη in the sense 'genius' is rare, cf. *Demetr.* 50.1 (the more usual word is δαίμων, e.g. *Tim.* 16.11, *de tranq. an.* 470d). There is nothing to suggest that Plutarch accepted the popular belief of his day that men were attended by good and/or bad spirits (I say more on this in the paper cited in n. 10); certainly the notion of Caesar's personal fortune here is Plutarch's modification (copied by Appian, *B.C.* 2.236, and Zonaras 10.8) of the original tale reflected in *reg. et imp. apophth.* 206c–d ('Have confidence in Fortune knowing that you carry Caesar'); Lucan talks of fortune/fate in his account, *B.C.* 5.497ff., but not as something belonging personally to Caesar (similarly Valerius Maximus 9.8.2, Cassius Dio 41.46.2–4; cf. also Suetonius, *D.J.* 58.2, Florus 2.13.37).

⁴⁰ cf. *Pomp.* 76.9 'if it was really still the planning of Pompey, and not a δαίμων which guided him on that course'.

⁴¹ *Brut.* 47.7, *Ant.* 56.6. For εἶδει in *Ant.* 56.6, cf. *Phil.* 17.2, *Pomp.* 75.5, *Dion–Brut. synk.* 2.2.

the aside at 56.6. The difference is not just a matter of caution in the *Lives* against rhetoric in the essay – at *Ant.* 31.1 we learn that ‘fortune provided’ Octavia as a pledge between Antony and Octavian, and there is a good parallel with *de fort. Rom.* at *Aem.* 12.3 where Plutarch affirms Aemilius’ strategic ability ‘unless one says that Perseus’ love of money was *τύχη ἀγαθή* for Aemilius’. It is to be remembered that fortune is used as a dramatic device in the *Lives* quite as often as it is in the essay, and in none of these cases is providence really at work. It has been noted that Plutarch believed the establishment of the principate owed much to divine interference.⁴² Human causality is just as important a factor, and the affairs of men and the political realities of a bad constitution made such a change inevitable (*Pomp.* 75.5, *Caes.* 28.4, *Dion-Brut. synk.* 2.2, *Cim.-Luc. synk.* 1.1). In the *Lives* these explanations often combine. In a rhetorical essay on fortune such human motivations are likely (though not always; see below, p. 513, on Tigranes) to remain unvoiced. What we find with Octavian at *de fort. Rom.* 319e is a full rhetorical exploitation of only one half of Plutarch’s serious thought.

In 8ff. Plutarch takes ‘historical’ events which show fortune’s support for Rome, beginning with Romulus. The details of the birth and discovery of the twins are with minor exceptions the same as in the *Life*.⁴³ In *Rom.* Plutarch also affirms the power of fortune in connection with them;⁴⁴ but he does not deny Romulus *ἀρετή*, and he makes it plain that both were involved here too (320b, 321b). A major difference from the *Life* is that there is no specific mention of Remus. That is understandable, for if he were mentioned it would be difficult to avoid his unfortunate murder.⁴⁵ With regard to Numa (9), it is interesting that in the essay Plutarch dismisses Numa’s liaison with Egeria as ‘perhaps somewhat fabulous’ (321b), because other mortals who had enjoyed divine love (Peleus, Anchises, Orion, Emathion) had not had happy lives (unlike Numa). In the *Life* Plutarch argues for the opposite conclusion, citing various law-givers who claimed intercourse with the divine, though as often on matters involving the gods he opts finally for a position of doubt (4.1–12). In the essay Plutarch’s wish is to put forward *τύχη* rather than Egeria as Numa’s real ‘partner, counsellor, and co-regent’ (321c). The point to note is that, while there is nothing to suggest that Plutarch really thought of *τύχη* as a goddess, portraying her as Numa’s partner is not so radically different from his speculations on Egeria in the *Life*.⁴⁶

Next (10) the fortune of Servius is given a lengthy treatment. Full information is given on his temples of Fortune,⁴⁷ and on the legend of his birth.⁴⁸ Servius’ unexpected advance to the throne is offered by Plutarch at 323d (cf. 323a) in support of his statement that Servius’ kingship belonged wholly to fortune; at *quaest. Rom.* 74, 281d

⁴² See n. 18.

⁴³ In the essay the servant of Amulius leaves them by the Ficus Ruminalis rather than the overflow of the river (Plutarch notes at *Rom.* 3.1 that there were many variant accounts); note the addition of an eclipse of the sun at Romulus’ birth to match that at his death (320b–c; cf. *Rom.* 27.7; hardly reliable information *pace* Barrow, *op. cit.* [n. 1], p. 128).

⁴⁴ See n. 18. cf. Favorinus, *On Fortune* 23 where one of the actions of unpredictable and capricious fortune is to send shepherds to find ‘the [exposed] kings of the Romans in Italy’.

⁴⁵ Plutarch is not in fact subject to the embarrassment characteristic of Dion. Hal. in such matters (*Rom.* 9.4–11.1, cf. Livy 1.6.3–7.3; Dion. Hal. 1.87.3: Romulus’ ‘grief and remorse’).

⁴⁶ Remember that Numa is not an historical figure, but lives in a semi-mythological age (*Numa* 15.1,3,11).

⁴⁷ cf. *quaest. Rom.* 74, 281d–f – note the additions there of Tyche Apotropaia and Tyche Mikra; 106, 289b–c. See above, n. 37 with text, on the likelihood that *quaest. Rom.* 74 derives from a list of temples in Latin.

⁴⁸ Taken anonymously from Dionysius (Ocrisia is not named by Livy) with an additional version credited to Antias.

it is taken for granted that Servius became king, having been a mere private citizen, διὰ τὴν τύχην (cf. Numa and Priscus at 318b, above, p. 509).

In 11 Plutarch gives examples of fortune from the defeat of Hannibal to the conquests of Pompey. It is only here that we find the concept of 'the great δαίμων of the Romans' (324b), which Plutarch affirms has been a constant and secure companion 'on land and sea'. There is nothing to make us think that Plutarch believed in personal deities or genii, still less that he accepted the notion of genii of nations as a whole.⁴⁹ The Romans' great δαίμων is pure fiction, comparable to the μέγας δαίμων of Julius Caesar, which avenges him after his death and becomes Brutus' δαίμων κακός (*Caes.* 69.2–14, *Brut.* 36.5–7, 48.1). Plutarch plainly conceives the Great Genius of the Romans as being at its most effective from the defeat of Hannibal, which is the earliest success mentioned (324b–d). Rhetorical as the δαίμων is, its period of operation fits in well with the implication of 317f–318a (above, pp. 509–10), that τύχη only came to give permanent support to Rome after the Hannibalic War.

At 324c Plutarch attributes to the great δαίμων the fact that the Cimbri and Teutones attacked in separate waves, and that Antiochus was unable to join forces with Philip, rather as he says at *Marc.* 3.2 that 'it seemed something wonderful and the result of good fortune that the Gallic War did not break out at the same time as the Punic War'. The *Marc.* passage probably expresses more than passing surprise, since supernatural interference is also offered at *Fab.* 17.1 to explain Hannibal's decision not to attack Rome immediately after Cannae. However, there are no comparable statements about fortune in *Marius* or *Flam.* In the case of Antiochus divine causality in *de fort. Rom.* operates through the wars he was busy with during the First Macedonian War (in Coele-Syria and Palestine). In *Flam.* 9 Plutarch explicitly ascribes the 'opportune peace' between the wars against Philip and against Antiochus to the callidity of Flamininus, who 'took away the last hope from Philip, and the first from Antiochus'. It would be wrong to argue that the difference is due to Plutarch's 'rational' source, Polybius, as against the rhetoric of the essay, for Polybius has not excluded the statements about providential aid to Roman power at *Flam.* 12.10 and *Phil.* 17.2. It is rather the case that Flamininus' statecraft is a theme of the *Life*, and Plutarch is keen to stress his foresight (which he did take over from Polybius – cf. 18.12.2–5). There is no such aim in the *de fort. Rom.*

Mithridates also was kept busy by his own wars from attacking Rome when Rome was involved in the Social War (324c). And while on this subject Plutarch notes that it was the great δαίμων which held back Tigranes from joining Mithridates at the height of Mithridates' power (324d). Here human motivation is provided ('suspicion and resentment'), through which fortune makes Tigranes act. In *Luc.* we are not told why he did not join with Mithridates during his successes; Lucullus merely expresses his amazement about the fact (23.7). But Plutarch could very easily have employed τύχη in the *Life* acting through Tigranes' paranoias, especially as he does speak of τύχη and of human motives in the same breath regarding Lucullus' failings (33.1–2; 36.5), and more importantly at *Cato Min.* 54.10 pictures Caesar's δαίμων making good use of Pompey's 'caution and distrust'. *De fort. Rom.* 324d is another example

⁴⁹ On genii, see n. 39 on Caesar's Fortune. For δαίμων applied to a nation, cf. *Alex.* 30.3 'the δαίμων of the Persians', with J. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander: a Commentary* (Oxford, 1969), ad loc. p. 78, observing that the idea is rare (it may have started as an attempt to catch an oriental way of expression – cf. *Them.* 29.2, *Artox.* 15.7, *Luc.* 27.6 for the δαίμων of Persian and Armenian kings; see Brenk, op. cit. [n. 1], p. 151); note that τύχη may also be applied to countries (*Pyr.* 29.11, *Alex.* 30.8).

of Plutarch's interest in the collaboration of human and divine causes, and shows clearly once more that *τύχη* is not presented in the essay in ways which are impermissible in the *Lives*.

In the next chapter (12) we are given the Gallic sack of Rome as an example of fortune (*τύχη καὶ ταυτόματον*, 324d⁵⁰) saving the city in times of disaster. The chance incident is the alarm raised by the sacred geese. Nowhere else is this attributed to fortune.⁵¹ As often with humans, Plutarch gives earthly and divine reasons for the geese's action. They were anyway timid and at that time were particularly restless through not having been fed (325c, cf. *Cam.* 27.2–3). But it was fortune which had the power to implant (325d) *νοῦν μὲν ἀλόγοις καὶ ἄφροσιν, ἀλκὴν δὲ καὶ θράσος δειλοῖς*. This is purely rhetorical,⁵² for Plutarch held that animals do have reason and virtue at least to some degree (*de soll. anim.* e.g. 962b–c, *Gryllus*). In keeping with *Cam.* Plutarch does not make fortune responsible for the whole Roman victory (nor is *τύχη* in the *Life* interwoven throughout to the extent it is in Livy).⁵³ He continues by citing Polybius' statement (2.18.3) that the Gauls retired because of pressure from their own enemies. 'If this is true,' he says in a perhaps unexpected qualification, 'no-one can argue that *τύχη* was not the cause of Rome's salvation' (325f–326a, cf. 11, 324c–d). What Plutarch is saying is that this is another clear example of the interrelation of divine and human causality.

Chapter 12 is a fine piece of narration which Plutarch freely admits is a digression (324d), enabling him to marvel at the future prosperity of Rome as the child of fortune (325d–f, cf. 8, 321a). The final chapter (13) is by contrast short and unfinished. As it stands, Plutarch speculates briefly on what would have happened had Alexander the Great met the Romans. He attributes Alexander's untimely death to *τύχη*. This is nowhere else the case. It does not necessarily follow that Plutarch believed Alexander would have won if he had lived: the last sentence underlines Rome's numerical strength and warlike spirit, and in *Pyr.* Plutarch puts into the mouth of Ap. Claudius Rome's 'ever repeated assertion' that had Alexander come to Italy he would have been defeated (19.2). What then of the ascription here of Rome's survival to fortune? Had Plutarch continued in his speculations Roman prowess and courage would doubtless have loomed large as in the narration of the Gallic sack in the previous chapter (cf. also what he says at 11, 323e). Plutarch is not suggesting that *τύχη* saved Rome so much as that she saved Rome from great bloodshed (326c – an adaptation of *Odyssey* 18.149, 'Not without bloodshed could this matter have been decided, I think'). In Livy's discussion of Alexander (9.16.11–19.17) Alexander's own fortune is mentioned (though not in the sense of a genius), but there is of course no idea that providence removed him.⁵⁴ This is rather a Plutarchan notion, recurring in his analysis of the late Republic (Crassus at *Pomp.* 53.8–9, Brutus at *Brut.* 47.7; Alexander's removal here does not of course facilitate power for other Greeks).⁵⁵ It

⁵⁰ On *ταυτόματον* see n. 15.

⁵¹ *quaest. Rom.* 287c, *Cam.* 27.2–3, Livy 5.47.4, Dion. Hal. 13.7.3, Diodorus Siculus 14.116.6, Cass. Dio, fr. 24.9 M., *de vir. ill.* 24, Zonaras 7.23, p. 156 D.

⁵² cf. 319d *τύχην... ἥς ἔργον ἦν... ἐπιτάξαι... ἀλκὴν δὲ τοῖς ἀθνημοτάτοις*.

⁵³ cf. Livy 5.34.2, 37.1, 38.4, 42.4, 43.6, 49.5, 51.4 *et al.*; Livy also identifies human failings, e.g. 5.37.3, 51.5.

⁵⁴ Livy does say of Alexander's uncle and brother-in-law, Alexander of Molossia (cf. *de fort. Rom.* 326b; below in text with n. 56), that *Romano bello fortuna eum abstinuit* (8.24.18 referring to his untimely death, and implying that it was his good fortune not to have had to fight Rome).

⁵⁵ cf. also the removal by exile of Dionysius II of Syracuse, a necessary preliminary to the liberation of Sicily in *Dion* (26.7–27.1, 50.4) and *Tim.* (14.2–3, 16.1).

shows again the close relation between *de fort. Rom.* and beliefs about providence which we find elsewhere.

The idea that Alexander was going to attack Italy, using the death of Alexander of Molossia as an excuse, is an invention of Plutarch's here designed to support his suggestions about fortune's aid for Rome.⁵⁶ He does not mention it when he talks of Alexander's intentions at *Alex.* 68.1.⁵⁷ That Alexander's plan is stopped by fortune does not suggest to me that here (or elsewhere) 'Plutarque, au fond de son coeur, regrettait qu'Alexandre n'eût pas eu le temps de s'emparer de l'Italie et d'établir au profit d'une dynastie hellénisée cet empire universel que Rome devait fonder.'⁵⁸

This suggestion merits comment: since Alexander was the greatest of the Greeks, surely Plutarch would have preferred power to lie with his descendants? In his *Life* Plutarch recognises Alexander as a very great man who possesses real virtue, and does not criticise him to any extent, perhaps because he did conquer the Greeks' traditional enemies, perhaps because he was not odious to the Greeks themselves (cf. 28.1 on his 'divinity'). But one cannot say that Plutarch would have been happy to have seen Greece (or even Rome) under Macedonian sway. He laments the victory of Chaeroneia which established the power of Philip and his son as the end of Greek liberty (cf. *Demosth.* 19.1); and at *Ages.* 15.4 he begs to differ with the opinion of Demaratus the Corinthian, that Greeks who did not see Alexander sitting on the throne of Darius were deprived of great pleasure – rather, he says, they would have cried at the loss of so many Hellenic generals at Leuctra, Coroneia, and so on. Further, Alexander's successors are subjected to intense rebuke in several passages for their dissimilarity to the divine ruler, their abominable conduct, and their foreign origin.⁵⁹ Although the Greeks of Thebes are said at *de Alex. Mag. fort. aut virt.* ii 342d to be Alexander's *ὁμόφυλοι καὶ συγγενεῖς* (through Heracles), and Philip V and Antiochus III are described as Greeks at *de fort. Rom.* 324b (cf. below), Plutarch's real views are those he expresses about the Macedonian force at Corinth, which is called 'a tyranny common to the whole of Greece' and an *ἐπακτὸν ἀρχήν... καὶ ἀλλόφυλον* (*Arat.* 16.2.4; cf. *Phil.* 8.6), and Aratus is taken to task for having 'barbarized the Peloponnese' with Macedonian garrisons (38.6; cf. *Ag./Cleom.* 37.7).

A comparable suggestion about *de fort. Rom.* 13 cooks up a grand salmagundi of the chapter and the Alexander essays, suggesting that Plutarch intended the fortune which removes the king here to be seen as continuing the obstructive fortune of the *de Alex. Mag. fort. aut virt.*⁶⁰ The idea has been criticised by others, so only brief comments are needed here.⁶¹ It is unprofitable to envisage serious links between works of a rhetorical nature about whose composition nothing certain is known. In the Alexander essays Plutarch presents fortune as obstructive in order to demonstrate

⁵⁶ Livy suggests that had Alexander seen the place where his uncle perished he would have been discouraged from invading (9.17.17 *vestigia recentia domesticae cladis*).

⁵⁷ cf. Hamilton, op. cit. (n. 49), ad loc. pp. 187–9. Parallel accounts talk hazily of sea-borne attacks on Italy or Sicily as part of Alexander's future conquests – Curtius 10.1.18 (Alps and Italian littoral), Diodorus Siculus 18.4.4 (the littoral from Spain to Sicily), Arrian, *anab.* 7.1.3 ('some say' Italy or Sicily); Arrian's *ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὑποκινεῖν αὐτὸν τὸ Ῥωμαίων ὄνομα* is perhaps influenced by *de fort. Rom.* 326c *ὄνομα γὰρ καὶ δόξα τούτων*. On these plans see A. B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 190–7.

⁵⁸ Flacelière, art. cit. (n. 1), 374 (cf. id., *AC* 32 [1963], 31); on Flacelière's views and my comments below, see G. Aalders, *Plutarch's Political Thought* (Amsterdam, 1982), pp. 21ff.

⁵⁹ *Arist.* 6.2–5; *Pyr.* 7.3, 8.2, 12.2–12; *Demetr.* 3.3–5, 41.4–5, 42.8–11; cf. *ad princ. induct.* 780f–781a.

⁶⁰ Wardman, art. cit. (n. 2), 99f.

⁶¹ See Hamilton, op. cit. (n. 49), p. xxx; Wardman later accepted many of Hamilton's remarks (*Plutarch's Lives* [London, 1974], p. 255 n. 41).

that Alexander is a true philosopher and representative of virtue. His death at *de Alex. Mag. fort. aut virt.* ii 343b is not an example of hostile fortune but of his superior human qualities. In *de fort. Rom.* 13 fortune does not hinder Alexander to point out his virtue, but in order to help Rome. It is safe only to value Plutarch's rhetorical works on the basis of what he says in serious works, and in the *Life of Alexander* not only is there merely a whisper of the great civilising mission, but also little enough on fortune hindering or helping the king in this respect or any other.⁶²

In many ways the *de fort. Rom.* is a traditional piece. It has been correctly observed that Plutarch has drawn on much the same stock of themes as Aelius Aristides did after him.⁶³ But Plutarch's work is quite different from the *To Rome*. The latter is unique among panegyrics for skirting round its subject; Plutarch by contrast deals with much of Rome's history, and with one exception covers all those periods where divine aid for Rome is evident also in the *Lives*. The exception is Rome's involvement in Greece. At *Phil.* 17.2 he states that after the conquest of Antiochus Roman power in Greece increased with divine aid;⁶⁴ at *Flam.* 12.10 he suggests that God furthered Rome's expansion in the Greek East as a whole in this period.⁶⁵ The suggestion made in *Flam.* is probably reflected *de fort. Rom.* 324b (Rome's Great Genius protects her 'on land and sea and in war and peace against barbarians and against Hellenes'), where the reference must be to Philip and Antiochus immediately below (even if Plutarch often denies that Macedonians are true Greeks). Divine aid in Rome's control over Greece itself is not mentioned. This is the more noticeable for the fact that the involvement of fortune in the one embarrassing topic of Rome's internal history, the Civil Wars, is saluted over two chapters (6–7). If one may assume a Greek audience for *de fort. Rom.*, it might be suggested that the notion that domination of Greece was facilitated consciously by fortune would have caused offence;⁶⁶ while any attempt to introduce Rome as the liberator of Greece in *de fort. Rom.* would have been preposterous and at variance with the tone of the major portion of the work in which everything goes Rome's way regardless of others. Thus Plutarch avoided the subject.

To the extent that there is in fact little attempt in the essay to link Rome's rise with desirable political benefits, unlike the equally rhetorical Alexander essays, *de fort. Rom.* may after all be described as a 'Stilübung' rather than a 'méditation'. However, we have seen that in the first two chapters where God and Time blend ἀρετή (meaning virtue) and τύχη (meaning fortune), Plutarch does stress his own idea that the increase in Rome's power was aided by the divine to bring political benefits to the world. And while there are many points of detail where *de fort. Rom.* diverges from comparable material in the *Lives* and the *Moralia*, the way in which fortune works, indeed the whole idea that events of history, especially Roman history, have been to some extent predetermined, squares firmly with Plutarch's serious beliefs.

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⁶² Hamilton, op. cit. (n. 49), pp. lxii, lxv.

⁶³ Jones, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 68 n. 7.

⁶⁴ Despite ἡ δ' ἰσχὺς ἐπὶ πάντα πολλή μετὰ τοῦ δαίμονος ἐχώρει, the statement seems to refer only to Greece, for it introduces Philopoemen's opposition to Romans in Greece.

⁶⁵ cf. 12.8 Ἑλλήνας... πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, 12.10 δῆμοι καὶ πόλεις... καὶ βασιλεῖς.

⁶⁶ As offensive, perhaps, as the acclamation of the Civil Wars before Roman listeners; since the Civil War is treated, we may be right in thinking in terms of a non-Roman audience (see n. 7). Although fortune's aid in Rome's domination of Greece is omitted, Plutarch's conception of fortune would not have appealed to those Greeks who alleged that Rome had been favoured purely by luck (cf. Polybius 1.63.9, Dion. Hal. 1.4.2–3, Onasander, proem 5–6, Appian, Pref. 43–4).